hampstor
10-22-2009, 11:42 AM
The article is way too big to fit into here... however i'll have to say it's one of the most interesting things i've read in a while.
Steven Rattner is the head of the Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry.
http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/21/autos/auto_bailout_rattner.fortune/index.htm
Some quotes that stood out for me:
When the Obama administration took office on Jan. 20, it inherited nothing in the auto area: no staff, no stacks of analyses, no plans of any kind. The Bush administration had decided in late December that GM and Chrysler were not going to go bankrupt on its watch and had shoveled $17.4 billion of TARP money into the companies to keep them afloat, but without any meaningful stab at restructuring them.
In my relatively few interactions with chairman and CEO Rick Wagoner, I found him to be likable, dedicated, and generally knowledgeable. But Rick set a tone of "friendly arrogance" that seemed to permeate the organization.
Certainly Rick and his team seemed to believe that virtually all of their problems could be laid at the feet of some combination of the financial crisis, oil prices, the yen-dollar exchange rate, and the UAW.
Because we were operating under TARP, we encountered relatively little congressional intrusion -- until the two automakers virtually simultaneously announced their dealer-reduction plans. Our dentistry had finally struck a nationwide nerve.
Every congressional district had dealers, many of whom were leading figures in their communities. We were inundated with an avalanche of calls, letters, and demands. We patiently worked through each grievance and explained hundreds of times that the companies -- not the government -- made the decisions about which dealers to close.
Steven Rattner is the head of the Presidential Task Force on the Auto Industry.
http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/21/autos/auto_bailout_rattner.fortune/index.htm
Some quotes that stood out for me:
When the Obama administration took office on Jan. 20, it inherited nothing in the auto area: no staff, no stacks of analyses, no plans of any kind. The Bush administration had decided in late December that GM and Chrysler were not going to go bankrupt on its watch and had shoveled $17.4 billion of TARP money into the companies to keep them afloat, but without any meaningful stab at restructuring them.
In my relatively few interactions with chairman and CEO Rick Wagoner, I found him to be likable, dedicated, and generally knowledgeable. But Rick set a tone of "friendly arrogance" that seemed to permeate the organization.
Certainly Rick and his team seemed to believe that virtually all of their problems could be laid at the feet of some combination of the financial crisis, oil prices, the yen-dollar exchange rate, and the UAW.
Because we were operating under TARP, we encountered relatively little congressional intrusion -- until the two automakers virtually simultaneously announced their dealer-reduction plans. Our dentistry had finally struck a nationwide nerve.
Every congressional district had dealers, many of whom were leading figures in their communities. We were inundated with an avalanche of calls, letters, and demands. We patiently worked through each grievance and explained hundreds of times that the companies -- not the government -- made the decisions about which dealers to close.